Robust Secure Precoding and Antenna Selection: A Probabilistic Optimization Approach for Interference Exploitation by Wei, Z & Masouros, C
ROBUST SECURE PRECODING AND ANTENNA SELECTION: A PROBABILISTIC
OPTIMIZATION APPROACH FOR INTERFERENCE EXPLOITATION
Zhongxiang Wei and Christos Masouros
Department of Electronic and Electrical Engineering
University College London, London
ABSTRACT
In this paper, to realize a power-efficient, user-centric and
physical layer security-addressing system, we investigate to-
tal power minimization by jointly designing antenna selection
and secure precoding for distributed antenna (DA) systems.
Different from the conventional artificial noise (AN)-aided
secure transmission, where AN is treated as an undesired el-
ement for the intended receiver (IR), we design AN such that
it is constructive to the IR while keeping destructive to the
eavesdroppers (Eves). Importantly, we investigate a practical
scenario, where the IR and Eves’ channel state information
(CSI) is imperfectly obtained. To handle the CSI uncertain-
ties, we solve the problem in a probabilistic manner, which
statistically satisfies the IR’ signal-to-interference-and-ratio
(SINR) requirement by use of constructive AN and addresses
security against the Eves. Simulation demonstrates our algo-
rithm consumes much less power compared to the centralized
antenna (CA) systems, as well as the DA systems with con-
ventional AN processing. Last but not least, a user-centric and
on-demand structure is presented by the algorithm, thanks to
the adaptive DAs activation/deactivation mechanism.
Index Terms— Distributed antenna, Antenna selection,
Secure precoding, Robust optimization, Constructive interfer-
ence
1. INTRODUCTION
Centralized multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) has been
considered as a key technology to provide high throughput [1]
and additional spatial diversity for enhancing physical layer
(PHY) security [2]. However, it incurs high power consump-
tion and suffers from an equal level of path loss (PL) from
the antenna array to one user [3]. To this end, distributed an-
tenna (DA) systems have been considered as an alternative [4]
to realize a user-centric and power efficient network. By geo-
graphically positioning the antennas and hence shortening the
communication distance, DA systems can reduce the PL and
facilitate an on-demand network by only activating those DAs
contributing the most. The concepts of user-centric DA are
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also suited for communications in industry, where antennas
can be distributed in the ceilings of large factories to effec-
tively extend network coverage, and is therefore a key con-
tender for industry Internet of Things [5].
As communication distance is shortened in DA systems,
however, it is easier for eavesdroppers (Eves) to seize the
confidential signal transmitted to the intended receiver (IR),
and PHY security becomes more challenging [6]. In the past
decades, PHY security has been extensively investigated to
secure wireless communications, where artificial noise (AN)
is generated to interfere potential Eves in isotropic [7] or spa-
tial manner [8]. However, it is worth noting that AN is al-
ways considered as a harmful element at the IR and its leak-
age needs to be minimized [9]. If AN can be beneficial to
the IR based on the concept of constructive interference (CI),
it helps improve the IR’s signal-to-interference-plus-noise ra-
tio (SINR). Symbol-level CI was introduced by [10], and the
authors in [11] further proposed a scheme to utilize AN in
a centralized antenna (CA) system. However, the fully ac-
tivated antennas in [11] lead to enormous power consump-
tion. Motivated by the aforementioned issues, in this paper,
we present joint design of DA selection and secure precod-
ing to minimize total power consumption, subjected to PHY
security constraints. Importantly, we consider a practical sce-
nario and solve it by probabilistic robust optimizations. Our
contributions are summarized as follows:
a. We investigate power minimization problem under the
IR’s quality-of-service (QoS) requirement and PHY security
constraints against Eves. DA selection and precoding are
jointly designed to fully utilize the additional degrees of free-
dom in DAs’ activation/deactivation and beneficial effect of
AN, which is shown to significantly reduce the total power.
b. We exploit joint DA selection and robust precoding
in a practical scenario, where the IR and Eves’ channel state
information (CSI) is imperfectly obtained. Explicitly, the
CSI uncertainties are processed in a probabilistic manner:
the IR’s QoS requirement and the security against the Eves
are addressed by chance constrained formulations. A low-
complexity algorithm is proposed to minimize total power
consumption, and at the same time AN is kept constructive to
the IR whereas destructive to the Eves.
c. A user-centric network structure is demonstrated by
the proposed scheme, compared to the CA counterpart. Ex-
plicitly, the working status of each DA is flexibly determined
by the IR and Eves’ positions to provide on-demand services,
thanks to the DA selection mechanism.
Notations: AH , AT and Tr(A) denote the Hermitian
transpose, transpose and trace of matrix A. diag (·) returns a
diagonal matrix. A  0 means A is a positive semi-definite
matrix. ‖ · ‖p means the p-norm. In means a n-by-n identity
matrix. Subscript R and I represent the real part and imag-
inary parts. CN×M and HN×M denote sets of all N × M
matrices and Hermitian matrices with complex entries.
2. SYSTEMMODEL AND CONSTRUCTIVE
INTERFERENCE
N DAs are connected to the central unit through a noise-free
wired front-haul for cooperative communications. Confiden-
tial message is transmitted to the IR in the presence of K
Eves. The IR and Eves are all equipped with single antenna
for simplicity [12]. CSI is obtained by channel estimation in
the training phase [4]. Without loss of generality, we assume
that all the DAs share the same drain efficiency [13].
We now briefly introduce the concept of CI. CI pushes the
received signals aways from the detection threshold [10]. The
increased distance to the detection threshold can effectively
improve the receiving performance. Denote w ∈ CN×1
and z ∈ CN×1 as precoding and AN at the transmitter
side. Denote the real channels as hd = hˆd + ed and
hk = hˆk + ek,∀k ∈ K, where hˆd ∈ CN×1 denotes
the estimated channel between the DAs and the IR with
estimation error ed ∈ CN×1, and hˆk ∈ CN×1 denotes
the estimated channel between the DAs and the k-th Eve
with error ek ∈ CN×1. Assume the channel estimation er-
ror of the IR and the k-th Eve follows normal distribution
ed ∼ CN{0, σ2d} and ek ∼ CN{0, σ2k},∀k ∈ K [14].
Denote xd = dejφd as the information-bearing symbol trans-
mitted for the IR. The received signal at the IR and the k-th
Eve can be calculated as
yd = h
T
d (wxd + z) + nd, yk = h
T
k (wxd + z) + nk, (1)
where nd ∼ CN (0, σ2n) and nk ∼ CN (0, σ2n) denote the Ad-
ditive white Gaussian noises (AWGN) at the IR and the k-th
Eve, respectively. Conventionally, the received SINR at the
IR and k-th Eve are denoted as Γd =
|hTdw|2
σ2n + |hTd z|2
, Γk =
|hTkw|2
σ2n + |hTk z|2
, where the AN is treated as an undesired ele-
ment at the IR. By contrast, the principle of constructive AN
is to rotate the phase of the AN at transmitter and to align
it with the desired signal at the IR [15]. Since the transmit-
ted signal can be also written as (w + ze−jφd)xd, according
to the geometric interpretation in Fig. 1, the requirement of
generating constructive AN can be given as
|={hTdw + hTd ze−jφd}| ≤
(<{hTdw + hTd ze−jφd} − σ
√
Γd)tanθ,
(2)
where θ = pi/M with constellation size M [16]. It can be
seen from (2) that the AN becomes a beneficial element to
the IR and the IR’ SINR Γd is also embedded. Since the AN
contributes to the useful signal power, the received SINR of
the IR becomes into
γd =
|hTd (w + ze−jφd)|2
σ2n
, (3)
where the transmission power can be efficiently reduced to
achieve a target SINR requirement.
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Fig. 1. Constructive and destructive AN for the IR and Eves
with QPSK modulation.
3. POWER EFFICIENT DA SELECTION AND
SECURE PRECODINGWITH IMPERFECT CSI
Problem formulation is given in 3.1 and its solution is pre-
sented in 3.2.
3.1. Problem Formulation
Define wn as the n-th element of the precoding vector w and
zn as the n-th element of the AN z. Define DA selection
vector t, whose element tn = {0, 1} means the n-th DA is
deactivated or activated, respectively. Let pon and poff rep-
resent the power consumption of each activated/deactivated
DA, and pDA represent the maximum available transmission
power at each DA. Let Γd and Γk denote the SINR require-
ment for the IR and physical layer security against the k-th
Eve. Accordingly, the problem is formulated as
P1 : argmin
w,z,t
|w + ze−jφd |2
α
+
N∑
n=1
(
tnpon + (1− tn)poff
)
s.t (C1) : |wn + zne−jφd |2 ≤ tnpDA,∀n ∈ N,
(C2) : tn = {0, 1},∀n ∈ N,
(C3) : Pr{ Γd ≥ Γd|ed} ≥ ηd, ∀k ∈ K,
(C4) : Pr{ Γk ≤ Γk|ek} ≥ ηk, ∀k ∈ K,
(4)
where α is the drain efficiency of the DAs. (C2) constrains
the selection vector to binary (on/off) elements. (C3) guaran-
tees that the SINR at the IR greater than the preset threshold
Γd with probability ηd, while (C4) guarantees the k-th Eve’s
SINR lower than the threshold Γk with probability ηk,∀k ∈
K.
3.2. Solution to the Problem
We first need to handle the probabilistic constraints (C3) and
(C4). Define u = w + ze−jφd . Under the provision of CI,
constraint (C3) can be written as two inequities
{
Pr{aTd,1[uR;uI ] ≤ −σn
√
Γdtanθ|ed} ≥ ηd
Pr{aTd,2[uR;uI ] ≤ −σn
√
Γdtanθ|ed} ≥ ηd,
(5)
where ad,1 = [ ˆhI,d − ˆhR,dtanθ + eI,d − eR,dtanθ; ˆhR,d +
ˆhI,dtanθ + eR,d + eI,dtanθ], and ad,2 = [− ˆhI,d − eI,d −
ˆhR,dtanθ−eR,dtanθ;− ˆhR,d−eR,d+ ˆhI,dtanθ+eI,dtanθ].
It is easy to obtain that the N -dimensional normal distributed
vector ad,1’s expectation is ad,1 = [ ˆhI,d− ˆhR,dtanθ, ˆhR,d+
ˆhI,dtanθ], and its covariance matrix is given as Θd,1 =
diag((1 + tanθ)2σ2e , ..., (1 + tanθ)
2σ2e︸ ︷︷ ︸
2N
). Also, vector ad,2’s
expectation is ad,2 = [− ˆhI,d− ˆhR,dtanθ;− ˆhR,d+ ˆhI,dtanθ],
with covariance matrix Θd,2 = Θd,1. Hence, the two in-
equalities in (5) can be written as two cumulative probability
functions in the form as Φ(−σn
√
Γdtanθ−ad,1T [uR;uI ]
||Θ
1
2
d,1[uR;uI ]||2
) ≥ ηd
and Φ(−σn
√
Γdtanθ−ad,2T [uR;uI ]
||Θ
1
2
d,2[uR;uI ]||2
) ≥ ηd, where Φ(·) denotes
the cumulative probability function of a standard normal dis-
tributed variable. Defining Φ−1(.) as the inverse function of
Φ(·), (5) can be written as
 ad,1
T [uR;uI ] + Φ
−1(ηd)||Θ
1
2
d,1[uR;uI ]||2 ≤ ϕ,
ad,2
T [uR,uI ] + Φ
−1(ηd)||Θ
1
2
d,2[uR,uI ]||2 ≤ ϕ,
(6)
where ϕ = −σn
√
Γdtanθ. According to Schur Comple-
ments [17], Eq. (6) can be finally written as

(
−ad,1T [uR,uI ]+ϕ
)
I
Φ−1(ηd)
Θ
1
2
d,1[uR,uI ]
(Θ
1
2
d,1[uR,uI ])
T
(
−ad,1T [uR,uI ]+ϕ
)
Φ−1(ηd)
  0,

(
−ad,2T [uR,uI ]+ϕ
)
I
Φ−1(ηd)
Θ
1
2
d,2[uR,uI ]
(Θ
1
2
d,2[uR,uI ])
T
(
−ad,2T [uR,uI ]+ϕ
)
Φ−1(ηd)
  0
(7)
We now handle the security constraint against the k-th
Eve in (C4) under the provision of destructive interference.
Confining the k-th Eve in the destructive region equals to
|={hTk u}| ≥
(<{hTk u} − σn√Γk)tanθ, and then the prob-
abilistic constraint (C4) can be transformed into

(
−ak,1T [uR,uI ]−ϕ
)
I
Φ−1(ηk)
Θ
1
2
k,1[uR,uI ]
(Θ
1
2
k,1[uR,uI ])
T
(
−ak,1T [uR,uI ]−ϕ
)
Φ−1(ηk)
  0,

(
−ak,2T [uR,uI ]−ϕ
)
I
Φ−1(ηk)
Θ
1
2
k,2[uR,uI ]
(Θ
1
2
k,2[uR,uI ])
T
(
−ak,2T [uR,uI ]−ϕ
)
Φ−1(ηk)
  0
(8)
where ak,1 = [ ˆhI,k+ ˆhR,ktanθ, ˆhR,k− ˆhI,ktanθ] and ak,2 =
[− ˆhI,k + ˆhR,ktanθ,− ˆhR,k− ˆhI,ktanθ] with covariance ma-
trix Θk,1 = Θk,2 = diag((1 + tanθ)2σ2e , ..., (1 + tanθ)
2σ2e︸ ︷︷ ︸
2N
).
(C3) and (C4) now have been handled into convex constraints.
However, the optimization problem is still non-convex due to
the binary variables in (C2) : tn = {0, 1},∀n ∈ N , which
can be relaxed to the following two constraints [18]
(C2a) : tn = [0, 1], ∀n ∈ N, (C2b) :
N∑
n=1
tn −
N∑
n=1
t2n ≤ 0, (9)
where (C2a) is the relaxed version of the constraint (C2),
and (C2b) confines the value of tn close to 0 or 1. Define
U = uHu. Introducing a penalty factor ϕ, typically of large
value, and moving (C2b) into the objective function, the ob-
jective becomes into
Tr(U)
α
+
∑N
n=1
(
tnpon+(1−tn)poff
)
+
ϕ
(∑N
n=1 tn−
∑N
n=1 t
2
n
)
, which shares the same optimal de-
sign policy and result with the original problem [18]. The last
difficulty lies in the non-convex term ϕ(
∑N
n=1 tn−
∑N
n=1 t
2
n)
in the objective term. It can be observed that
∑N
n=1 tn −∑N
n=1 t
2
n is the difference of two convex functions w.r.t the
variable tn, and thus can be handled by successive convex ap-
proximation such that
∑N
n=1 tn −
∑N
n=1 t
2
n ≤
∑N
n=1 tn −∑N
n=1(t
(i)
n )2 − 2∑Nn=1 t(i)n (tn − t(i)n ), where t(i)n denotes the
value of tn at the i-th iteration [19]. Now, P1 becomes into
P2 : argmin
u, t
Tr(U)
α
+
N∑
n=1
(
tnpon + (1− tn)poff
)
+ ϕ
( N∑
n=1
tn −
N∑
n=1
(t(i)n )
2 − 2
N∑
n=1
t(i)n (tn − t(i)n )
)
,
s.t (C1), (C2a) : tn = [0, 1], ∀n ∈ N, (C3) : (7),
(C4) : (8), (C5) :
[
U u
uT 1
]  0, (C6) : U  0.
(10)
Now P2 is a standard semi-definite programming prob-
lem, which can be solved by CVX [20]. To tighten the ap-
proximation, the value of t(i)n is updated in an iterative way,
i.e., we solve P2 and substitute the intermediate optimal value
of t∗n to t
(i)
n iteratively, ∀n ∈ N , until convergence. The suc-
cessive convex approximation serves as the upper bound of
the original problem, which is iteratively minimized and also
lower bounded by the SINR and PHY security constraints.
Hence, the convergence of the algorithm is confirmed.
4. SIMULATION RESULTS
We present the simulated performance in this section. The
central frequency is set to 2 GHz with 1 MHz bandwidth. The
AWGN power spectral density is -174 dBm/Hz. A 100× 100
m2 square cell is considered with N = 16 uniformly fixed
DAs [4]. The IR and K = 14 Eves are randomly distributed
across the map. Drain efficiency of all DAs is set to α = 40%.
Power consumption parameters are set to pon = 500 mW,
poff = 50 mW, and pDA = 1000 mW, respectively. CSI
error is set to σd = σk = 0.01. The PHY security against
the Eves is set to Γk = −10 dB, and probabilities are set to
ηd = ηk = 0.95, ∀k ∈ K. The PL model in [21] is adopted.
Besides, the most related schemes, CA system without an-
tenna selection (CA-no-AS) [11] and DA systems with con-
ventional AN (DA-conv-AN) [2] are selected as benchmarks,
while our proposed algorithm is named as DA-prob.
Fig. 2 a) shows the impact of the IR’s SINR requirement
Γd on the total power consumption. Firstly, it can be seen that
the proposed algorithm outperforms the two benchmarks. It
is because the proposed algorithm benefits from DAs’ selec-
tion, the DAs far from the users may be deactivated for sav-
ing power. Hence, the proposed algorithm achieves a user-
centric and on-demand network structure with higher degree
of freedom over the CA-no-AS algorithm in [11]. Besides,
our proposed algorithm rotates AN to make it constructive
to the IR even with imperfect CSI, while AN is treated as
an undesired element at the IR by conventional DA-conv-AN
in [2]. Secondly, benefiting from geometric distribution of the
DAs, the distances between the DAs and users are shortened
and the system can always find near DAs to serve the users.
With the alleviated PL as well as the lower required transmis-
sion power, DA can outperform its counterpart CA in terms
of power efficient transmission. Thirdly, increasing the SINR
threshold Γd leads to higher power consumption, as more an-
tennas become activated and dissipate more circuit and trans-
mission power. Also, the power consumption of the CA-no-
AS algorithm is dominated by its circuit power because of the
fully activated antennas, and its power consumption increases
slowly as the increased transmission power is overwhelmed
by its circuit power consumption.
Fig. 2 b) shows the total power consumption with dif-
ferent number Eves. It can be seen that as the number of
Eves increases, higher power of AN is needed to against the
PHY security requirements Γk, ∀k ∈ K, and thus total power
consumption is increased as well. However, the total power
consumption of the proposed algorithms increase slowly with
more Eves, since AN contributes beneficially for the IR and
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Fig. 2. a) The IR’s SINR requirement vs. total power con-
sumption. b) The number of Eves vs. total power consump-
tion, where Γd = 20 dB.
the weight of precoderwmay be relatively reduced to achieve
the SINR target Γd. By contrast, the two benchmarks con-
sume higher power with more Eves, either hindered by the
high circuit power consumption at the multiple antennas (CA-
no AS) or underutilized AN at the IR (DA-conv-AN).
5. CONCLUSIONS
To minimize total power consumption for DA systems with
CSI uncertainties, antenna selection and precoding have been
jointly optimized by probabilistic robust optimization. By
the chance-constrained formulation, the proposed algorithm
is able to satisfy the IR’s QoS and simultaneously address
PHY security against the Eves. Simulation has showed that
the proposed algorithm consumes much lower power com-
pared to the CA-no-AS and DA-conv-AN benchmarks. Fur-
thermore, benefiting from the antenna selection mechanism
in DA systems, a flexible and user-centric network structure
is featured over its counterpart CA systems.
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